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"The meat we eat is no more nourishing than 
the grain the animals are fed." 
-James Rachels, "Vegetarianism and 
'The Other Weight Problem'," p. 185. 
"...whatever else be true, whether there be gods 
or only atoms, whether men are significantly 
superior to non-human animals or no, whether 
there be life to come or this poor accident be 
all, this at least cannot be true, that it is proper 
to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be 
other moral principles than this, but this at least 
is dogma. And if this minimal principle be 
accepted, there is no other honest course than 
the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and 
most bio-medical research." 
-Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status 
ofAnimals, p. xiii. 
Introduction 
This paper is an analysis of one of the main moral 
arguments for vegetarianism, the vegetarian argument 
from unnecessary pain. This argument is derived from 
the moral principle that unnecessary pain is wrong, and 
obviously the soundness of any argument using the 
principle depends on what is meant by the terms 
'unnecessary' and ·pain.' The term 'unnecessary' can 
refer to either: (a) an end that is itselfunnecessary (and, 
therefore, whatever pain is endured in gaining the end 
is afortiori unnecessary); or (b) an unnecessary means 
to a necessary end (namely, the means is unnecessary 
because another means is available). My concern in 
this paper is with the second interpretation, and so I 
can make only a few brief remarks about the frrst,2 
Although the term •pain' functions in both, its analysis 
is best undertaken as part of the longer, fuller analysis. 
Briefly, regarding unnecessary ends, since in the 
vegetarian argument the end is adequate human 
nutrition, the end is not unnecessary if human beings 
are to survive. In contrast to adequate nutrition, more 
obviously unnecessary ends are using animals for 
decoration (taxidermy), symbols of social status (furs 
and exotic birds), and entertainment (rodeos). These 
latter ends are nonessential for human survival and 
suitable substitutes are readily available for achieving 
the same ends. In contrast, nutrition is significantly 
necessary: humans cannot be healthy and free of 
suffering without it, we eventually will die without it, 
other ends are severely limited when we are unhealthy 
or suffering, and other ends are impossible when we 
are dead. Nutrition is obviously not a fmal end in itself 
PHILOSOPHY 
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but is a means to some further ends, such as a healthful 
life or the Good Life. Although the Good Life can be 
achieved without rodeos and stuffed, mounted animal 
corpses, it cannot be achieved without adequate food. 
According to classical hedonistic utilitarianism, the 
end to be maximized is pleasure, not human nutrition. 
Ifpleasure is the summum bonum and all pleasures are 
equal, including human and other animal pleasures, then 
adequate human nutrition as an end should be 
overridden in all cases where greater pleasure would 
result from human malnutrition and death, including 
perhaps the demise of the entire human species. As I 
argue below, the mere plausibility of this argument is a 
reductio ad absurdum for hedonistic utilitarianism. 
I take it that there can be no serious objection to the 
necessity as an end of adequate human nutrition, and 
so this first reading of the term 'unnecessary' wiu not 
be pursued further. I turn now to may main concern in 
this paper. 
The Extended Argument 
The second reading of 'unnecessary' requires a 
"multiple means" calculus in which two or more means 
are contrasted according to the principle of unnecessary 
pain. The result is an extended argument involving three 
steps, as outlined below: 
I 
1.10 A vegetarian diet is adequate for human 
nutrition. 
1.20 A meat (omnivorous) diet is adequate for 
human nutrition. 
1.30 Therefore, a meat (omnivorous) diet is 
unnecessary for human nutrition. (From 
1.10,1.20) 
II 
1.40 A vegetarian diet causes no pain to the 
animals. 
1.40 A meat diet causes pain to the animals. 
1.60 Therefore, a meat diet causes unnecessary 
pain. (From 1.30, 1.40, 1.50) 
III 
1.70 Causing unnecessary pain is wrong. 
1.80 Therefore, a meat diet is wrong. (From 
1.60, 1.70) 
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This argument has convinced many to be vegetarians, 
but is it sound? It needs careful analysis for conceptual, 
logical, and empirical correctness. Based on the more 
questionable claim in each, I am labeling the three 
subarguments, respectively, the Empirical Argument 
from Nutrition, the Empirical Argument from Pain, and 
the Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain. 
The Empirical Argument from Nutrition3 
In the Empirical Argument from Nutrition, the 
formal structure of the argument is valid. In other 
words, ifthe premises (1.10, 1.20) were unambiguously 
true, then theconclusioo that meat-eating is unnecessary 
(1.30) would follow from the premises. Logically: p 
is 'necessary' for q if and only if q will not obtain 
withoutp; and,p is 'unnecessary' for q if q will obtain 
withoutp, that is, if there is another possible cause for 
q. In the Empirical Argument from Nutrition, the goal 
is adequate nutrition, and two means are allegedly 
possible, a meat diet and a vegetarian diet. The 
presumed availability of the vegetarian diet makes the 
meat diet "unnecessary." The logic of this argument is 
indisputable. However, I argue below that the 
conclusion does not follow because Premise 1.10 
confusingly equivocates what is meant by "vegetarian" 
and "adequate." Literally as stated, Premise 1.10 is 
either false orambiguous, and therefore must be revised. 
Vegetarianism is not even initially plausible unless 
the diet is nutritionally adequate (1.10). Despite the 
claim's central importance, often it is merely asserted 
without qualification or support, as by James Rachels 
when he states, "The meat we eat is no more nourishing 
than the grain the animals are fed."4 Most discussions 
favoring vegetarianism give the claim only cursory 
treatment, usually by citing as proof the large numbers 
of vegetarians who are "hale and thriving."5 World-
class athletes, Hindus, Seventh-Day Adventists, and 
Trappist monks often are listed as evidence of the diet's 
healthfulness.6 
Obviously this is an inductive hasty generalization: 
the empirical fact that some vegetarians are healthy does 
not prove that all humans--or even most humans--will 
be healthy on a vegetarian diet. Minimum Daily 
Requirements (MDRs) vary from person to person and 
from ethnic group to ethnic group. Just as particular 
individuals and ethnic groups are susceptible (or 
immune) to certain diseases (such as sickle cell anemia 
and skin cancer), particular individuals and ethnic 
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groups (especially those from colder climates when they stop producing? To get the milk, cows 
traditionally dependent on large quantities of meat and must have calves. What happens to the calves, 
dairy products) may require more of the nutrients found especially the bull-<:alves? Moreover, unprocessed 
in meat due to centuries of high meat consumption and eggs and milk have significant amounts of 
natural selection. Their gastrointestinal tracts may not saturated fats and cholesterol, which contribute 
digest and absorb adequate nutrients from purely to heart disease, and many people are unable to 
nonanimal sources. Moreover, of the "hale and eat dairy products due to a lactose intolerance. 
thriving" vegetarians cited as proof, most are not strict The B-12 in eggs is in the cholesterol-laden yolk, 
vegetarians (vegans) but rather eat eggs (ovo- not the protein-rich egg white that can be eaten 
vegetarians) or milk products (lactovegetarians) or both without danger. An alternative would be to rely 
(ovolactovegetarians). In addition, many take vitamin on vitamin supplements. 
and nutrient supplements, and many have suffered ill-
health from their dieL For instance, cited by Jane Brody 3. Vegetarians are at risk of developing Iron 
as proof of the healthfulness of vegetarianism,' Bill Deficiency Anemia because only 5-10 percent 
Walton, star of the Portland Trailblazers, suffered of the iron in vegetables is absorbed during 
numerous bone fracture problems due to his diet.8 digestion. The large amounts of fiber in 
Despite the fact that three-fourths of them took vegetarian diets bind up the iron preventing 
supplements, a recent nutritional analysis of ovo- absorption. In contrast, via a different bio-
lactovegetarian Trappist monks found that "a number chemical process, 10-30 percent of the iron in 
of the subjects had low intakes of some nutrients, meat is absorbed. Although the iron is readily 
particularly the B-vitamins and calcium, iron, available in vegetables, a haphazard diet will be 
magnesium, and zinc."9 deficient. As with B-12, vitamin supplements 
Listed below are several empirical facts lO that limit may be taken; but, unlike B-12, iron can be toxic. 
the scope of Proposition 1.10: . Iron supplements can also cause gastrointestinal 
disturbances. 
1. Vitamin B-12 is an essential nutrient and 
naturally occurs only in animal products (meat, 4. Increased amounts of iron are required by 
eggs, and dairy products). Absent from humans, menstruating women, pregnant women, 
microorganisms in the intestines ofother animals adolescent boys and girls, and old people 
synthesize the vitamin. Deficiency in B-12 (usually due to small amounts of internal 
causes Pernicious Anemia, gastrointestinal bleeding)-that is, all age groups except adult 
disorders, neurological impairment, and males. Vegetarians in these groups are especially 
eventually death. Consequently, vegans must at risk of developing Iron Deficiency Anemia 
supplement their diet with vitamin pills, tempeh and therefore are advised by authorities to 
or miso (soy) fennented with the Klebsiella monitor their diets closely or else take 
bacteria, yeast grown on media rich in B-12, or supplements. 
foods artificially fortified with B-12. Forthese 
reasons, many vegetarians are ovolacto- 5. Pregnant women and nursing women who are 
vegetarians. vegetarians are especially susceptible to 
deficiencies in all the B vitamins. They should 
2. If the worldwide human population depended consume eggs, dairy products, or supplements. 
solely on eggs and dairy products for balanced 
nutrition, huge additional quantities would be 6. Infants and preschool children need animal 
needed. For example, three whole eggs or three protein, at least eggs or dairy products. Even 
cups of whole milk (or seven cups of skim milk) with an ovolactovegetarian diet, they may also 
must be consumed to obtain the MDR of B-12. need supplements. Vegan infants and children 
Without meat in the diet, hens and cows would are usually malnourished, underweight, and 
have to be exploited far beyond currenllevels. neurologically underdeveloped. Nevertheless. 
What should be done with the hens and cows with careful attention to their children's diets, 
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some vegans have been able to raise healthy 
preschool children. 
7. Protein needs vary depending upon stress, 
disease, injury, loss of sleep, activity, and other 
factors. Although adequate protein normallycan 
be obtained from complementary vegetable 
sources, the protein in cereals, legumes, and nuts 
is less digestible and less balanced than that in 
meat, eggs, and milk. 
8. Vegan diets are also especially susceptible to 
deficiencies in calcium, riboflavin, Vitamin 
A,and Vitamin D because these are in short 
supply in vegetables. Susceptible to osteo-
porosis, all vegan women must carefully monitor 
their calcium intake since they consume no dairy 
products. Supplements from nonanimal sources, 
however, are readily available. 
Based on these eight empirical factors, either 
Proposition 1.10 is literally false or it ambiguously 
equivocates the scope and meaning of the terms 
"vegetarian" and "adequate." To be true, the claim must 
be revised to one of the following propositions: 
I.lOa Except for pregnant women, infants, and 
small children, and only if vitamin and 
mineral supplements are included, a vegan 
diet is usually adequate for human nutrition. 
1.10b An ovovegetarian diet is usually adequate 
for human nutrition but may require vitamin 
and mineral supplements. 
1.1Oc A lactovegetarian diet is usually adequate 
for human nutrition but may require vitamin 
and mineral supplements. 
1.10<1 An ovolactovegetarian diet is usually 
adequate for human nutrition but may 
require vitamin and mineral supplements. 
Incorporating all of these necessary revisions (1.10a-
d) into one fully qualified (and hence true) proposition, 
Premise 1.10 now becomes: 
l.l0e Except for pregnant women, infants, and 
small children, and only if vitamin and 
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mineral supplements are taken, a vegetarian 
diet (vegan, ovovegetarian, lactovegetarian, 
or ovolactovegetarian) is usually adequate 
f<y human nutrition. (Conjunction of 1.10a-d) 
Moreover, in severecircumstances when the supplemented 
vegan or ovolactovegetarian diets are unavailable, such 
as in underdeveloped nations and during poverty or 
drought, even this revision would fail, and the meat 
diet would be circumstantially necessary. 
To keep the argument sound, this revision ofPremise 
1.10 requires a revision of the conclusion. The 
following is a revision of the entire argument: 
l.l0e Except for pregnant women, infants, and 
small children, and only if vitamin and 
mineral supplements are taken, a vegetarian 
diet (vegan, ovovegetarian, lactovegetarian, 
or ovolactovegetarian) is usually adequate 
for human nutrition. 
1.20 A meat (omnivorous) diet is adequate for 
human nutrition. 
1.30a Therefore, except for pregnant women, 
infants, and small children, and only if 
vitamin and mineral supplements are taken, 
a meat (omnivorous) diet usually is 
unnecessary for human nutrition. (From 
l.l0e,1.20) 
I think that these revisions significantly weaken and 
undermine the entire vegetarian agenda. Without a 
source for vitamin B-12 (usually eggs, milk product.", 
or supplements), all vegetarians will become 
malnourished; and, without careful attention to iron in 
the diet or iron supplements, all age groups except adult 
males are at risk ofbecoming malnourished. All vegans 
are especially at risk: in both regards. Vitamin B-12 
deficiency and iron deficiency may take several years 
to appear and can be life-threatening; surely 00 one 
should run the risk. One's life quality can be marke.dly 
diminished for years, and recovery can be very slow. 
For most people, vegetarianism will not provide an 
adequate diet unless supplements are taken. 
Accordingly, the advice of many vegetarian authorities 
is to play it safe and take a supplement. From a moral 
perspective, I think that the vegetarian diet is so risky 
that no one should impose it on another person. 
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Vegetarian parents face a particularly difficult dilemma: 
Should they compromise their moral beliefs by 
providing animal foods for their children, or should they 
risk malnutrition and underdeveloped children? 
In addition to the empirical difficulties regarding 
Premise 1.10, the argument also involves significant 
conceptual confusion in the move from "adequate for 
human nutrition" in the premises (1.l0e, 1.20) to 
"unnecessary for human nutrition" in the conclusion 
(1.30a). To help you see my point, consider the 
following diets: 
Kathy: Peanut butter, microwave biscuits, Big 
Macs, Diet Coke, candy bars, ice cream, 
and One-A-Day Plus Minerals vitamins. 
George: Steak, potatoes, coffee, beer, and whiskey. 
Dan: Meat and dairy products only due to rare, 
life-threatening allergy prohibiting all 
vegetable protein. 
Alice: All four basic food groups as recom-
mended by the U. S. Food and Drug 
Administration. 
Bill Runningbear: Fish, seafood, caribou, and other 
meats from Arctic wildlife. 
All of these diets are conceivably "adequate",especially 
if supplements are taken, as in Kathy's case. 
Supplements can make almost any diet "adequate." For 
Kathy, supplements are probably "necessary" to her 
"adequate" diet. Moreover, George can argue that 
whiskey is "necessary" to his diet since otherwise he 
might not get enough total calories. Kathy can similarly 
contend that Big Macs and candy bars are ''necessary.'' 
Caloric deficiency is one fonn of malnutrition; adequate 
caloric intake is essential. In different senses, meat is 
"necessary" to both Bill's and Dan's diets: Bill's Arctic 
environment will not grow vegetables, and Dan's allergy 
prohibits vegetables. Also in different senses, Bill and 
Dan have "natural" diets: Bill's diet is restricted by his 
"natural" environment, and Dan's is limited due to a 
"natural" genetic deficiency. Probably Alice's diet is 
the only one that is "naturally" "balanced" and thereby 
"adequate," but her daily diet includes meat and would 
usually include items that are neither stric tly 
"necessary" nor "natural," such as processed margarine 
and refined sugar. Her diet also occasionally includes 
"unnecessary" foods like chocolate chip cookies, 
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fruitcake, and coconut pie, all of which collectively 
make up part of her "adequate" diet. 
Perhaps by now my point is evident: the notions of 
"adequate," "necessary," "natural," and ''balanced'' are 
perhaps hopelessly ambiguous and imprecise. The 
confusion seems to be located in the singular-
distributive and wholistic-collective aspects of the 
concepts. For example: as a distributive, singular 
component of a diet, whiskey may be "unnecessary" 
because it lacks most nutrients other than calories and 
can be replaced by more nutritious foods; but, as a 
component in a coUective whole, the calories from the 
alcohol may be "necessary." Hence, the alcohol could 
be "dislributively unnecessary" while being "collectively 
necessary." Moreover, except for highly refined foods 
likebreakfast bars and astronautcookies, no food taken 
singularly would be "adequate." As already noted, 
supplements can make virtually any diet "adequate," a 
fact that partly explains the current obsession with 
health foods and vitamins. 
I do not think that it would be very helpful to 
continue to try to sort out these conceptual confusions, 
even if it were possible. Neither totally distinct nor 
completely free ofequivocation, the relevant questions 
apparently are three: I) What is a "nonnal" diet? 2) 
What is a "balanced" diet? 3) what foods are "naturally 
(routinely and regularly) available"? The complicated 
answers to these questions involve evolutionary, 
biosocial, physiological, nutritional, genetic, agricultural, 
ecological, socioeconomic, historico-temporal, and 
cultural aspects. For example, Scandinavians may be 
dependent upon seafood and dairy products if they are 
going to have balanced diets that can be produced 
naturally, regularly, ecologically, and economically in 
their harsh, cold climate. By way of contrast, due to 
the semidesert ecosystem and depending on population 
density, West Texans would probably have to depend 
upon range-fed animals such as cattle or sheep, 
especially during droughts and after the subterranean 
water sources currently used for irrigation are 
exhausted. 
Deep ecologists predict that the best-and perhaps 
only-Iong-tenn agriculture for our environmentalJy 
crippled planet will be one where each local, 
ecologically autonomous bio-region produces "native" 
flora and fauna to feed its own population. Over-
populated regions will have to depopulate, and all 
people will eat primarily locally produced foods, which 
seldom occurs today except in underdeveloped 
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nations, Perhap.'S the well-to-do of the future will eat 
like today's Japanese and the poor like today's Chinese. 
Despite the empirical provisos and conceptual 
confusions, vegetarians may still contend that today 
most humans have a general duty not to eat meat 
because eggs and dairy products do not require killing 
the animals, supplements are readily available, and 
physicians can monitor one's health. Although prior 
generations may have been exempt and some 
underdeveloped nations may still be, modern 
pharmaceutical and medical technologies have now 
made vegetarianism healthy for virtually all people. 
Our culture has outgrown meat-eat.ing. 
Several reasons may make meat-eaters reject this 
general duty. First, worldwide ovolactovegetarianism 
(UOb-d) would produce problems of unimaginable 
scope, especially if people were not permitted to eat 
the unproductive hens,CO'NS, andcalves. Theanimals would 
probably suffer hambly. Mxoover, hem and cows would 
not do very wen in many climates, either drastically 
draining dle resources or requiring imported products. 
Second, the vegan diet requires careful attention and 
supplements. Many people may find it to be too much 
trouble, too risky. Until our culture widely adopts and 
markets the diet, most people are probably too ignorant 
and uninformed to be adequately nourished. But this is 
surely only a transitional problem that can be remedied 
by education and marketing. In itself, having to pay 
close attention to nutrition in one's diet can also 
characterize meat-eaters, who can also be malnourished 
if their diets are not balanced. Mere inconvenience does 
not justify actions that are otherwise immoral. 
Next, vegetarianism might work well for the middle 
classes but probably would put at risk the health of the 
laboring classes, who require more nutrients, purchase 
cheaper foods, are less educated, and are more 
habituated to the staple diet of their cultures-to the 
"meat and potatoes" or "pork and rice" diets. Many 
poor people, especially the rural poor, raise animals for 
food. They can raise a pig or have chickens with liUle 
more than garbage and table scraps. Admiuedly many 
poor people, especially the urban poor, could purchase 
more food and be better fed if they did not buy so many 
expensive meat products, which they now mistakenly 
think they need in large quantities. Despite vegetarians' 
hopes of feeding the starving, impoverished masses 
with the grain now fed to livestock, vegetarianism is a 
middle-class movement The nutritional, ecological, 
and agri-economic feasibility of widespread 
vegetarianism is questionable. So far, vegetarianism 
largely has been parasitic upon meat-eating cultures. 
Finally, relying upon pharmaceutical companies 
for essential food-namely, vitamin and mineral 
supplements-may be technological madness. Is 
anyone morally required to depend upon pharmaceutical 
companies for health or nutritional peace of mind? 
Although readily available today in the developed 
nations, only a few generations ago these supplements 
were not widely available-and continue to be 
unavailable in many parts of the world. Perhaps 
someday on this planet people will consume plastic 
meals artificially synthesized on huge chemical farms, 
but such ~l time hopefully will never occur, at least not 
by choice. We are by nature omnivores. The farm and 
garden c:ontinue to capture most of our idyllic 
imaginations; we surround ourselves with pets, trees, 
shrubbery, and flowers. To give up natural foods for 
supplements would be to lose part of our hereditary, 
biosocial, aesthetic, and perhaps mental health. The 
point is this: we may be forced by economic and 
ecological pressures to consume less and less natural 
animal products, but it is nutritionally unrealistic to 
expect our overpopulated planet to flourish on either 
vegan or ovolactovegetarian diets. 
The Empirical Argument from Pain 
Next in the extended argument, the tenn "pain" is 
added to the term "unnecessary" in the Empirical 
Argument from Pain. This sub-argument provides an 
empirical transition from the empirical nonnecessity of 
the meat diet to the moral Principle ofUnnecessary Pain. 
Give the availability of a balanced vegetarian diet, 
meat-eating is in fact "unnecessary" for adequate 
nutrition (1.30, 1.30a). But even if meat-eating is in 
fact unnecessary for nutrition, vegetarianism does not 
follow unless pain also results. Meat-eating would be 
wrong according to the Principle of Unnecessary Pain 
only if the meat diet does in fact produce pain in the 
animals (1.50) and only if the meat diet causes more 
pain than the vegetarian diet (1.40). In other words, 
for the Principle of Unnecessary Pain to apply, there 
must be a conjunction of three empirically true 
propositions: (1) "A meat diet is unnecessary for human 
nutrition" (1.30), (2) "The vegetarian diet causes no 
pain in the animals" (1.40), and (3) "The meat diet 
causes pain in the animals" (1.50). These propositions 
need careful examination. 
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As already established, meat-eating is in fact 
unnecessary for human nutrition only if the vegetarian 
diet includes eggs, milk products, or vitamin and 
mineral supplements (1.lOa-e, 1.30a). Worldwide 
ovolactovegetarianism, as argued earlier, is both 
impractical and exploitive of the animals. Although 
eggs and milk can be humanely and economically 
produced in some bio-regions as part ofpluralistic crop 
ecology, worldwide dependence would result in 
ecological stress, increased agricultural monism, and 
immense pain for many of the animals, especially the 
old, unproductive ones. Surely slaughter would be more 
humane than abandoning the unproductive animals. 
Feeding the unproductive would consume valuable 
resources in a poorly diversified agricultural system 
overburdened by producing enough milk and eggs for 
the huge population of ovolactovegetarians. The 
problems we now have from abandoned pets make 
me doubt whether our society would provide humane 
care for unproductive cows and hens. The animal pain 
resulting from worldwide ovolactovegetarianism 
would surely be greater than that of a humane 
carnivorous world. 
These considerations show that, if vegetarianism 
were adopted by a large population, most would have 
to be vegans. Therefore, when considered on a wide-
spread scale, Proposition lAO is best regarded as false, 
except for veganism. It should be revised as follows: 
lAOa A vegan diet causes no pain to the animals. 
But as already noted, the protein content in the vegan 
diet is inadequate for many people, notably pregnant 
women, infants, and small children, and all vegans 
would need vitamin B-12 supplements. In a vegan 
world, B-12 might become a priceless commodity, 
although technological wizardry would hopefully come 
to the rescue. Perhaps eggs and milk would be produced 
for those requiring the extra protein, although 
technology might again meet the need. Nevertheless, 
animals probably would still be needed in some limited 
or severe situations, such as in impoverished regions 
and during droughts. 
We now come to the claim that meat-eating causes 
pain, Proposition 1.50. This claim is conceptually 
ambiguous, having several possible and somewhat 
arbitrary meanings. I examine three of these. 
First, it could mean that, even on the most 
conceivably humane and delightful animal farm, 
Winter 1991 19 
raising and slaughtering animals for meat would cause 
the animals at least some pain-perhaps miniscule-
even though on balance they would live heavenly lives. 
Since meat is not needed for nutrition (1.30, 1.30a), 
even this miniscule pain would be unnecessary. The 
obvious criticism of the interpretation is that the 
pleasure would vastly outweigh the pain-for the 
animals and humans. Unless animals have some status 
that prohibits exploiting and killing them, this first 
interpretation fails. 
Second, Proposition 1.50 could mean that, ifanimals 
are mised and slaughtered for meat, the life of each 
animal in itself would have on balance more pain than 
pleasure to the individual animal. Although perhaps 
when human benefits are added the total balance might 
be positive, the animals themselves have miserable 
lives. They are mere means to our ends. When we do 
not need the meat (1.30, 1.3Qa), it would be cruel to 
inflict such pain on the animals merely to satisfy our 
taste for flesh, as Rachels argues. In comparable cases 
where the lives of the animals on balance will be bad 
for the animals, such as stray dogs and severely diseased 
pets, we consider it our duty to euthanize the animals. 
Moreover, if we will not provide humane care to our 
pets, we regard it as our duty not to indulge in having 
them. Even if the moral aspect of this interpretation 
were unquestionably true, namely, if it were our duty 
to prevent animals from living lives that are on balance 
bad for the animals, the empirical aspect of this 
interpretation, namely, that the food animals live such 
lives, would still be questionable, especially when the 
animals are raised on traditional farms. Even by today's 
intensive methods, except for battery chickens, tethered 
sows, and veal calves, most food animals during their 
lives probably experience individually more net 
pleasure than pain. 
Do we have a duty to prevent animals from living 
lives that are on balance bad for the animals? If this is 
a strict duty, then we must police wild nature, preventing 
predation except in optimal cases, feeding the hungry, 
caring for the diseased, rescuing the misfortunate, and 
so on. Such duties to the wild, if taken seriously, would 
quickly exhaust our economic resources and probably 
destroy our civilization. In contrast to wild nature, we 
surely do have such duties to our pets because we choose 
to have the pets and thereby enter into implicit contracts 
to provide for their needs in exchange for their being 
our pets. We do not have to have the pets. Not to care 
for them, or to kill them prematurely for our 
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convenienc.e, would be to break the oontract, to betray 
the relationship we have with them. 
One might object that the oontract is not with the 
pets because they are not moral agents and so are not 
the kind of beings with whom we can make even 
implicit reciprocal contracts. All we break are our 
intentions, assuming we intended to keep the pets for a 
long time. If there is a contract at all, it is merely with 
ourselves. Although this objection makes important 
points, it still seems to me that people are wicked when 
they plan to ldll their pets prematurely for trivial reasons, 
such as not wanting to pay while on vacation for the 
pet's room and board. or desiring the animals only while 
they are frisky puppies or kittens. 
But do such duties extend beyond pets to domestic 
food animals? Given the availability of an adequate 
vegetarian diet, we do not have to have the food animals. 
As with pets, we choose to have them. Therefore, surely 
we owe them at least humane treatment-that their lives 
be on balance good. But would killing them 
prematurely constitute betrayal? Unlike our pets, we 
have the food animals for the pwpose of raising them 
for slaughter. Our intent throughout is to kill and eat 
them. They would not exist otherwise, and we have 
not even tacitly entered into a contract to provide for 
their needs beyond the optimal time of slaughter. 
A not uncommon case, morally interesting but 
equally sad, is the food animal that is made into a pet, 
often by children as 4-H or FFA educational projects. 
When these animals are slaughtered, conceivably both 
the child and the animal are betrayed and harmed. 
Another duty to pets, and perhaps to other animals, 
is the duty to educate them. Probably not self-conscious 
in the wild, many animals may develop self· 
consciousness, heightened rationality, and even a 
reciprocal sense of moral duty while loved and trained 
by their owners in the human sociocultural environ-
ment. l1 Notable examples are seeing-eye dogs and 
chimpanzees. Ironically and inconsistently, it is 
precisely because animals have these capacities that they 
are desired as pets, and it is because they do not that 
they are exploited. As with uncivilized and uneducated 
human slaves, serfs, peasants, and laborers, we can leave 
the animals wild and untrained, thereby providing ad 
hoc grounds for exploiting and slaughtering the 
mindless brutes. We can also breed and socially 
condition both humans and animals to be inferior, 
tranquil, stupid, and aesthetically disgusting, thereby 
easing our elitist consciences. 
Proposed by Holmes Rolston, III, the "homologous 
principle" asserts that, when we choose to domesticate 
animals, our minimal duty is to guarantee that they will 
live lives that are at least as good as, and as pain free 
as, their lives would have been in the wild.12 Moreover, 
their deaths by our hands must be at least as pain free 
as the deaths that they would have suffered in the wild. 
Rolston's principle correctly emphasizes that optional 
human actions ought to increase the net balance of good 
in the world, not decrease it. What I find unacceptable 
about the principle is that it permits doing intrinsically 
wrong actions in order to bring about optional goods, a 
point that I will develop more fully later. 
Third and fmally, Proposition 1.50 could mean that, 
when animals are raised and slaughtered for meat, the 
net calculus ofoombined pleasures and pains, in~luding 
both animal and human pleasures and pains, is negative. 
This empirical claim is questionable, as argued below. 
In order to imagine the multitude of factors involved, 
consider the following thought experiment. The 
question is a conflict of two worlds: WI is a vegetarian 
world, and W2 is a meat-eating, omnivorous world. If 
we assume that in both worlds human nutritional needs 
are met, then what is the relevant hedonistic difference 
between the two worlds? WI has the pleasure derived 
from vegetarian dishes without the pain w animals; 
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whereas, W2 has the pleasure derived from meat-eating 
plus whatever pleasure the animals experience during 
their lifetimes lessened by whatever pain the animals 
experience. 
W}-Animals are not raisedfor food 
No relevant animal pain. 
No relevant animal pleasure. 
Human pleasure from vegetable dishes. 
W2 -Animals are raisedfor food: 
Animal pleasures while alive. 
Animal pains while alive. 
Animal pains during slaughtering. 
Human pleasure from vegetable dishes. 
Human pleasure from meat dishes. 
In what sense can we say that one world is better or 
worse than the other? In W2, if the animals are raised 
humanely and slaughtered mercifully, their lives on 
balance would yield more pleasure than pain. To this 
pleasure would then have to be added the pleasure of 
the meat dishes. Therefore, W2 would have on balance 
more pleasure than Wl-except when the food animals 
are mistreated. 
In estimating the utility calculus, the pleasures of 
the food animals themselves must be taken into account. 
If the animals raised in W2 were also raised but not 
slaughtered, then billions of the vegetarian world would 
surely have more pleasure. But, if no one ate meat, 
then billions of animals would not exist and would not 
experience any pleasure. Most food animals could not 
survive in the wild, and society surely would not pay 
for their food and veterinary costs. An oversight of 
some vegetarians is to desire the healthy animal 
populations of W2 without the pain of killing. 
Admittedly, the continued pleasurable existence of any 
particular animal in W2 would make W2 a better world, 
but W2 would not exist and that animal would not exist 
ifW2 were not carnivorous. The utility contrast should 
be between WI and W2, not between different possible 
states of W2. In addition, in W2 when the particular 
animal is killed and eaten, it is usually replaced by 
another animal that experiences pleasure until it, too, 
is killed and replaced. This is the so-called 
"replaceability argument."13 In other words, by virtue 
of the fact that it is a carnivorous world, W2 sustains a 
level ofpleasure (reduced by the animals' pain) that on 
balance is probably higher than the vegetarian world. 
Winter 1991 21 
The animals would not exist and would not enjoy any 
life if they were not to be eaten. 
Some vegetarians urge that WI would produce 
millions of happy animals in the wild on lands now 
used for pasture and animal feed. Nature is not "red in 
tooth and claw" because most species are herbivores, 
not carnivores. Less cultivation would free vast 
acreages for reforestation, wilderness, and wildlife. 
Despite these idyllic wishes, even if we could return 
the land to its aboriginal innocence. animal populations 
and pleasures would probably not be maximized 
thereby. Animals in the wild often suffer-from disease, 
malnutrition, stress and predation. Moreover, many 
wild species flourish in greater numbers and health in a 
mixed rural-wilderness. Rolston states: 
The climax forest of 31'1 ecosystemic succession 
is usually not suited for the maximum number 
and kinds of fauna and flora, and this 
succession can be interrupted by agriculture 
with benefit to those natural species that prefer 
fields and edging. There are more deer in 
Virginia now than when the Indians inhabited 
its visually unbroken forests, and that is 
probably true of cottontails, bobwhites, and 
meadowlarks. Suitable habitat for all but a 
few of the wildest creatures can be made 
consistent with the rural use of land.14 
Consequently. the best hedonistic world is some version 
ofW2. one with both wild and domestic animals suitably 
balanced by the agricultural and ecological sciences. 
Moreover, it seems that a pleasure-pain calculus 
taken by itself would require that we eat meat. Because 
W2 results on balance in more pleasure than Wh we 
are obligated by utility considerations to eat meat. 
Unless animals have some status (or intrinsic value) 
that would prohibit their slaughter for food, we are not 
only free to eat meat but are obligated to do so. Of 
course, we should not raise animals to such an extent 
that feeding the animals would produce a world 
ecological crisis or food shortage, and we would not 
eat meat to such an extent as to produce our own ill-
health. But a certain optimum amount of meat-eating 
would seem to be obligatory because it would raise the 
net level of both human and animal pleasure without 
significant losses due to animal pain. Numerous food 
animals can be raised on garbage and rangelands 
unsuitable for cultivation. 
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Although I would not defend the following 
argument, it seems plausible to me to argue on 
hedonistic utilitarian grounds that another world (W3) 
populated only by nonhuman animals would be a better 
hedonistic world than either WI or W2' Without human 
beings converting natural habitats into cities and 
fannlands, sentient animals would be free to reproduce 
and experience large amounts of pleasure, reduced of 
course by the pains of predation, disease, and natural 
disaster. Or, perhaps the best world would be a world 
with huge nonhuman animal populations and only a 
few human shepherds and veterinarians to care for the 
animals. If this argument is even plausible, then 
hedonistic utilitarians need to take seriously a duty to 
bring about the extinction of the human species, unless 
human beings have intrinsic value and capacities for 
nonhedonistic intrinsic goods that make them superior 
to nonhuman animals. If human beings are genuinely 
superior, then the better world would seem to be some 
version of W2 where human beings would seek to 
maximize the populations ofbottl their own species and 
other species to the extent warranted by ecological 
factors and genuinely qualitative living for all. The 
mere plausibility of W3 is a reductio ad absurdum for 
the hedonistic utilitarian argument. 
Vegetarians may still insist that there is a sense in 
which W2 is not a better world than WI: W2 involves 
killing and eating animal flesh. If this statement is a 
moral judgment (rather than, for example, an aesthetic 
one), it assumes that animals have some kind of moral 
status beyond mere pleasure-pain sentience that makes 
killing them wrong. Consider another world (W4) where 
unwanted day-old human babies are painlessly killed 
and eaten.ls Will a similar "pain" argument apply? 
Surely some humans would derive pleasure from 
eating roasted baby, and W4 would then seem to be a 
better world than W2 or WI' But, most of us would 
object that the act ofkilling and eating humans for food 
makes W4 a worse world, but our objection would not 
be a hedonistic one because it assumes that human 
beings have an intrinsic value that prohibits killing 
and eating them for food. The reason we do not kill 
and eat human beings-regardless of the pleasure 
produced-is because they have a superior status above 
that of other animals. Unless it can be established that 
food animals have a human-like status, orat least a status 
sufficiently high enough to prohibit killing and eating 
them, meat-eaters are free to continue their diets. 
Because most food animals are social, probably 
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conscious, and to some extent rational, many 
vegetarians hold that the animals have a status far above 
that of mere sentience. 
Finally, vegetarians may contend that W2 can never 
be humane: the huge world population and demand 
for meat will necessitate intensive animal husbandry 
and monstrous slaughterhouses. Meat-eaters are self-
deceived. The fact of the matter is, the meats in the 
local supennarkets are the bodies of animals that lived 
horrible lives and died cmel deaths. In our capitalistic 
economy, one cannot eat meat, even moderately, without 
contributing to the market demand for meat and 
encouraging the abusive system. It is unrealistic to 
envision W2 as a humane world of family farms and 
small butcher shops. In our densely urban world, city 
dwellers cannot reasonably be expected to buy directly 
from small farmers and local butchers. The meat-grain 
industry is big business controlled by a monopoly of a 
few multinational corporations. In the United States, 
one-third ofall raw materials per year goes to livestock 
foods, which is more than the entire oil, gas, and coal 
industries combined.16 Allegedly, refaml is impossible. 
and therefore the only moral alternative is abstinence 
from all flesh foods. 
In rebuttal, meat-eaters have argued that abstinence 
is not required as long as one's meat consumption is 
moderate and as long as one actually works for refonn.17 
I have lived on a family farm, and I know that the 
animals can be humanely raised and mercifully 
slaughtered. Like poverty, overpopulation, nuclear 
armament, and the environment, justice in food 
production and distribution is an enonnous problem, 
but the enonnity of Lite problem and the economic and 
political power of agribusiness does not entail inaction, 
especially in a democracy. Conscientious meat-eaters 
can join in the movement to help the family farmers. 
Through tax breaks and legislation, they can help insure 
that lands near cities will be reserved for small farms 
that will be used for food production for the neighboring 
cities. Small farms raising livestock, vegetables, eggs, 
poultry, and dairy products can thrive in these locations. 
Farmers' markets and excursions into the country to 
buy food would bring consumers directly into contact 
with producers. Meat-eaters can work to stop 
overpopulation and to pass laws regulating agribusiness. 
Many city-dwellers can become weekend farmers. 
Gardening can be taught. We can insist that grocers ' 
supply range-fed beef and barnyard eggs and poultry. 
Moderation with reform is not impossible. 
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In conclusion, the Empirical Argument from Pain 
fails, except for the vegan diet, which has morally 
significant nutritional limitations. Moreover, hwnane 
animal husbandry would increase the balance of 
pleasure, not decrease it. Although contemporary 
intensive farming methods are deplorable, genuine 
efforts for moderation and reform are morally 
responsible ways to address the problem. Consumers 
of meat are no more responsible for the abuses of 
agribusiness than consumers of heating oils are 
responsible for the abuses ofoil producers. Unless other 
moral considerations intervene. and perhaps they do, 
omnivores would seem to be free to raise food animals 
humanely and to kill them mercifully. Such prohibitions 
might be grounded in the essential status or dignity of 
the animals as living, conscious, sentient, rational beings 
living in a community.IS If it is wrong on such grounds 
to exploit and kill animals, then no amount of humane 
treatment and good consequences would justify the 
abuses. 
The Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain 
Finally, the third step in the extended argument needs 
attention. Whereas the other two steps were empirical, 
this step is moral (or evaluative). The moral maxim 
prohibiting unnecessary pain is applied to meat-eating. 
For instance, in an emotive passage, Stephen R. L. Chuic 
states: 
...whatever else be true, whether there be gods 
or only atoms, whether men are significantly 
superior to non-human animals or no, whether 
there be a life to come or this poor accident be 
all, this at least cannot be true, that it is proper 
to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be 
other moral principles than this, but this at least 
is dogma. And if this minimal principle be 
accepted, there is no other honest course than 
the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and 
most bio-medical research.19 
The Principle of Unnecessary Pain (also called the 
Principle of Noninjury) is a deontological (that is, 
nonteleological or unconditional) moral principle that 
has primafacie priority over all other moral principles, 
including the Principle of Beneficence (which is 
succinctly put, "do good").20 In other words, pain can 
be inflicted (or injury done) only in cases of genuine 
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conflict and only in order to prevent an unavoidable 
worse evil. Although we also have a duty to do good 
according to the Principle of Beneficence, we are 
prohibited from doing evil as a means to bring about 
good. The Principle of Utility, that the good should be 
maximized, is secondary to and derivative from the 
Principles of Noninjury and Beneficence. Utilitarian, 
teleologically based actions could conceivably justify 
blatant wrongs, such as secretly killing innocent persons 
in order to bring about good; and, the priority of the 
Principle of Noninjury prohibits such acts. 
How do these principles apply to meat eating? 
Hedonistic utilitarianism would justify meat-eating, as 
explained above, as long as the animals live on balance 
good lives. They benefit and meat-eaters benefit. In 
the evaluative, moral step of their argument, hedonistic 
utilitarians appeal to the Principle of Beneficence and 
the Principle of Utility. But, unless it can be shown 
that death is not a harm to the animals or that the 
conflicts are legitimate and unavoidable, this utilitarian 
move would be undercut by the prima facie priority of 
the Principle ofNoninjury. When the meat is not needed 
for nutrition, the pain and death of the animals are 
avoidable, illegitimate wrongs, and these acts would 
not be justified by appeal to some higher, optional good, 
including human or animal welfare. Meat-eating would 
be prohibited except in particular cases of legitimate 
conflict wherein a worse evil would result without the 
meat. When the purpose is merely to achieve some 
greater utilitarian good, such as dietary convenience, 
gustatory delight, or agricultural efficiency, meat-eating 
would not be justified. Only those meat-eaters actually 
and unavoidably needing the meat for nutrition would 
be justified. Moreover, despite its overwhelming 
positive net utility, not even the delightfully good 
omnivorous world considered earlier-where the 
animals live on heavenly farms and experience only 
miniscule pain-would be justified because evil is being 
done to bring about good. 
The Principle of Noninjury would not prohibit 
animal husbandry, but it would probably make the 
practice unprofitable. Animals could be farmed as long 
as they were given good lives and were allowed to live 
out their natural lives, dying of old age. Eggs, milk, 
and wool could be obtained, and the bodies of the 
deceased, aged animals could be used for food and 
clothing.21 
In an insightful version of the Principle of Utility, 
Rolston attempts to justify meat-eating by appeal to 
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what he calls the "Principle of Value Capture."22 
According to this notion, the values of a lower level 
are "captured" and carried forward, or transcended, in 
a higher level or gestalt. Animal farming and meat-
eating help make possible the qualitatively higher values 
of culture, values such as civilization, society, religion, 
the fine arts, and intellectual reflection. Rolston's 
insight, I think, is the recognition that values are 
qualitatively different and that pain is often endW'ed in 
order to bring about qualitatively superior goods. 
Nevertheless, if it were correct, Rolston's principle 
would seem to justify discriminatory practices such as 
slavery. According to the Principle of Non-Injury, we 
are not justified in inflictill8 such pain on innocent 
beings merely to bring about a positive good. 
At least two other moves are open to traditional 
meat-eaters and animal farmezs. First, as mentioned 
earlier, they can argue that food animals are not the 
kind of beings to whom morality applies-including 
the Principle of Unnecessary Pain. Beings lacking in 
full rationality, language, self-consciousness, and 
continuity of self-identity across time-that is, merely 
sentient beingSo-are devoid of any "self' that can be 
harmed or injured. "Pain" in such self-less beings is 
not really pain but simply neurophysiological activity. 
Their mental states, if such exist at this low level of 
psychic activity, are little more than isolated packages 
of biochemical, neuronal activities. If killed quickly, 
such beings would not be harmed, at least not in any 
morally relevant sense. 
This response is, I think, conceptually and morally 
correct but, its application to most food animals is 
empirically mistaken. Except perhaps for fish, food 
animals are not merely sentient automatons. Evolu-
tionary and physiological evidence indicates that 
animal species comprise a neurophysiological 
continuum such that radical separation of homo sapiens, 
despite our superiority, is mistaken. Similar brains, 
central nervous systems, sensory organs, and behaviors 
convince me that the above response is too reduc-
tionistic. Cattle, sheep, hogs, and perhaps chickens are 
highly sentient and conscious social beings who live in 
communities, have memories, communicate with each 
other, recognize each other, and solve genuinely novel 
problems.23 Killing such creatures, even painlessly, 
does them irreparable harm. Therefore, the Principle 
of Unnecessary Pain applies. 
The second move is to argue that the Principle of 
Noninjury is merely primafacie. At issue are the kinds 
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of conflicts that legitimately override the principle. 
Nutrition and health are surely significant and legitimate 
overriding moral conflicts; no autonomous person can 
reasonably be coerced to put their health at risk. Also 
legitimate and unavoidable are the following: humans 
are by nature omnivores; widespread humane 
ovolactovegetarianism is impractical; small-scale 
humane ovolactovegetarianism is parasitic on meat-
based agriculture; veganism is impossible for many 
people; veganism requires supplements; and all forms 
of vegetarianism are nutritionally risky. Although not 
idealistically unavoidable, several contemporary 
sociocultural factors are also relevant: beliefs about 
animals are often religiously based and dogmatically 
implacable; agribusiness is the most powerful and 
wealthy multinational induslry24 and is unlikely to stop 
meat production; despite higher regard for animals and 
widespread criticisms of behaviorism, most animal 
ethologists and psychologists still deny the self-
consciousness of food animals; underdeveloped and 
impoveri~hed counlries need to utilize every conceivable 
food source, including animals; widespread vegetar-
ianism might disproportionately risk the health of the 
laboring classes, especially the rural poor; in a strained, 
overpopulated world ecosystem, numerous food 
animals could be raised on garbage, noncultivatable 
pastures, and other foodstuffs inedible to humans; and, 
many philosophical ethicists for good theoretical and 
practical reasons consider meat-eating morally 
permissible, if not morally justified. Unless food 
animals are the kind ofbeings, like humans, that cannot 
be used as mere means to ends, then surely these factors 
collectively override the prima facie prohibition 
against inflicting unnecessary pain. As a matter of fact, 
the pain inflicted is not unnecessary. 
Conclusion 
Individually and collectively, all three steps in the 
vegetarian argument from unnecessary pain fail: the 
Empirical Argument from Nutrition because equi-
vocation occurs regarding what is meant by "vegetarian," 
"adequate for human nutrition," and "unnecessary for 
nutrition"; the Empirical Argument from Pain because 
food animals can be raised humanely and killed 
mercifully, and because moderation in consumption and 
actual efforts for reform are morally acceptable 
responses to the current abuses; and, the Moral 
Argument from Unnecessary Pain because the prima 
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facie obligation not to inflict pain is overridden by the 
nutritional risk of vegetarianism (especially veganism) 
and by numerous contemporary sociocultural 
circumstances beyond the individual's control. 
Collectively, the arguments succeed only for those 
individuals who know they can do well on a vegan diet. 
Based on the Principle of Unnecessary Pain. perhaps 
all persons would then have at least a prima facie duty 
to try to be vegans and thereby to discover whether they 
would do well on the diet. Nevertheless, because the 
Principle of Unnecessary Pain is merely prima facie 
and because the risks and sociocultural conflicts are 
genuine. I do not think anyone has a duty even to try to 
be a vegan. 
Briefly discussed a few times in the above analysis, 
another argument would trump these considerations. 
If food animals are self-conscious and rationally 
autonomous, then they would possess the same moral 
status that prohibits exploiting and killing humans. 
Although most food animals are probably not self-
conscious, a few particular individuals perhaps are.25 
The issue then becomes whether the status of those 
unusually and atypical few confers indefensible moral 
status on the entire species. In some cases I think it 
does. For instance, the fact that some chimpanzees are 
self-conscious entails that murdering any chimpanzee 
is criminal. Fortunately, some entire species of food 
animals, such as shrimp and fish, are unquestionably 
not self-conscious. 
Because meat-eating is so deeply entrenched in our 
culture, moderation and reform are probably best-
both for the health of individual humans and for the 
long-term benefit of the exploited food animals. Meat 
does not need to be eaten daily; a few servings weekly 
are more than sufficient to off-set any risk in a largely 
vegetarian diet. As a means ofreform and in comparison 
to abstinence, moderation stands a far better chance of 
being widely adopted in our implacably carnivorous 
society and thereby of improving the lives offood animals. 
The collective failure of these arguments seems to 
me to be significantly more tragic than theirindividual 
failures. I wish things were otherwise. I wish that we 
were not as nutritionally dependent upon meat as we 
are and that the sociocultural circumstances were better. 
But, we are naturally omnivores. we are grossly 
overpopUlated, and we are greedily capitalistic. 
Although it should not be imposed on autonomous 
persons, being a vegetarian is good because it reduces 
the demand on our environment, strikes a blow against 
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capitalistic injustices, and spares at least a few animals 
pain and death. And perhaps a few of those so spared 
are self-conscious. 
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